Frances T. Wightman v. Bettilyon\u27s Inc. and Salt Lake City Corp. : Plaintiff\u27s Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1963
Frances T. Wightman v. Bettilyon's Inc. and Salt
Lake City Corp. : Plaintiff 's Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hanson & Baldwin; Merlin R. Lybbert; Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent;
Skeen, Worsley, Snow & Christensen; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant;
A. M. Marsden; Attorney for Defendant and Respondent;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Wightman v. Bettilyon's Inc., No. 9987 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4390




STATE OF UTAH ' ~ D 
FRANCES T. WIGHtMAN, I) L ~ !j 
1 f, : .:J\;\J 
vs. 
N O'J 1 :- ! 
Plaint iff-Appellant, ) __ ........ -----······\·-___, 
-----------·······-· Court, Uta • 
.-----... ,-. . Suprerr.e 
·- ~)· 
BETTll.YON 1S, INC. and ) Case No. 9987 
) 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 




PLAIN!' IFF'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, Judge 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
701 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
515 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Bettilyon 1s, Inc. 
A. M. MARSDEN 
414 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Salt Lake 
City Corporation 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LCHER COURT • • • • • • 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. • • • • • • 
STATEMENT OF FACTS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
ARGUMENT • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFEN-
DANT BETTn YON 1 S, INC. HAD NO DUTY TO EL 1!'\fiNATE 
WEEDS GRO\·JING OVER THE PUBLIC SIDE~lALI<, THAT 
THE WEEDS HERE NOT AN OBSTRUCTION CONSTITUTING 
A NUISANCE UHICH BETTIL YON 1 S SHOULD HAVE 





GROWTH AS A MAlTER OF LAW • • • • • • • • • 11 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PLAINTIFF 
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 28 
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN RULING PLAINTIFF 
ASSUMED THE RISK AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND THE 
RECORD WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO SO 
RULE. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 40 
CONCLUSION • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
CASES CITED 
Arbuckle v. l~asatch Land & Improvement Co. 




Basinger v. Standard Furniture (1950), 118 Utah 
121, 220·P. 2d 117. • • • • • • • • • • • • 14 
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc. 
(1960) , 11 Utah 2d 1 , 354 P • 2d 55 9 • • • • 2 
i 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Calder v. Cit~' and County of San Francisco 
(Cal., 1942), 123 P. 2d 897, 898-9 ••• • 26 
Cannon v. Neuberger, 1 Utah 2d 396, 268 
P. 2cl 425, 426 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 27 
Clauson v. ~Jalgreen Drug (1945), 108 Utah 
577, 162 P. 2d 759 • • • • • • • • • • • • 3C 
Clay v. Dunford (1952), 121 Utah 171, 239 
P. 2d 1075 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 41 
Cole v. Kloepfer (1953), 123 Utah 452, 260 
P. 2d 518 •••••••••••• • 3~, 36, 37 
Concho Construction Co. v. Oklahoma Natural 
Gas Co. (C. A. lOth, 1953), 201 F. 2d 673 13 
Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Cunningham 
(1960), 10 Utah 2d 329, 353 P. 2d 168 • • 29 
Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 71 Utah 1, 262 
P. 269, 273 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 27 
Eisner v. Salt Lake City (1951), 120 Utah 675, 
238 P. 2d 416 • • • • • • • • • • • 35, 36, 37 
Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed (1954), 1 Utah 2d 308, 
265 P. 2d 1013, 1016 • • • • • • • • • • • 24 
Holland v. Columbia Iron Mine Co. (1956), 4 
Utah 2d 303, 293 P. 2d 700 • • • • • • • • 29 
Hunt v. Tooele City (1959), 8 Utah 2d 323, 
334 P. 2d 558 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 37 
Jackson v. Southwestern Public Service Co. 
(N. N., 1960), 349 P. 2d 1029 • • • • • 32, 46 
Jacques v. Farrimond (1963) 1 14 Utah 2d 166, 
380 P. 2d 133 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 42 
Joel v. Electrical Research Products, Inc. 
(C.C.A, 2d, 1938), 94 F. 2d 508, 590. ·• 14 
ii 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
McLaughlin v. City of Los Angeles (Cal., 
1943), 140 P. 2d 416 • • • • • • • • • • 33, 47 
Owen v. City of Los Angeles (Cal., 1947), 
187 P. 2d 860 ••••••••• o • 38, 44, 45 
Rodri3uez v. City of Los Angeles (Cal., 
1959), 341 P. 2d 410 • • • • • • • • • • 30, 47 
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Billings (Okla., 
1959). 353 p. 2d 636 • • • • • • • • • • 12 
Salt Lake City v. Schubach (1945), 108 Utah 
266, 159 P. 2d 149 • • • • • • • • • • • 25 
Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative 
(1961), 11 Utah 2d 101, 377 P. 2d 1010 • 2 
Updegraff v. City of Norman (Okla., 1955), 
287 P. 2d 909 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 26 
Hold v. Ogden City (1953), 123 Utah 270, 
258 P. 2d 453 • • • • • • • 38, 39, 40, 41, 43 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
11 A. L. R. 2d 636 
• • • • • • • • • • • • 
Restatement of Torts: 
Section 363 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Comment b following Section 363 
TEXTS CITED 




Prosser on Torts 15 19 27 41 43 
. . . . . . . ' ' ' ' 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 
10-8-23 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
10-8-24 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
78-38-1 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City 
Section 38-1-8 • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 






Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCES T. WIGHTMAN, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
vs. ) Case No. 9987 
BETTILYON'S, INC. and ) 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 





NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff seeks damages for personal injuries 
resulting when she tripped at night over high weeds 
growing from abutting property onto and obstructing 
the Salt Lake City public sidewalk, Bettilyon's, 
Inc. being the occupant of the abutting property. 
DISPOSITION OF CPSE IN LO~mR COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lal~e County, Aldon J. Anderson, Judge, granted 
each defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
plaintiff appeals therefrom as to each defendant. 
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEPL 
·Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Summary Judg-
ment in favor of each defendant made and entered 
by the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County on August 7, 1963 and remand of 
the action for trial upon the merits as to each 
defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On appeal from Summary Judgment, the dis-
favored party is entitled not only to have the 
court consider all facts in the record and 
inferences fairly arising therefrom in light most 
favorable to him, but is also entitled to rely 
on his pleadings unless the record precludes all 
reasonable possibility of recovery and indisputably 
resolves against him all allegations of fact. 
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., (1960), 
11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559; Tanner v. Utah Poultry 
& Farmers Cooperative (1961), 11 Utah 2d 101, 377 
P. 2d 1010. Therefore, in setting out the facts, 
plaintiff, as disfavored party, will not only refer 
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3 
to the record herein but will also set out those 
facts outside the record on which plaintiff would 
rely to support the allegations of the Complaint 
and which are not contradicted by the record. 
Plaintiff, a 58-year old widow, sustained a 
fractured right hip in falling on August 22, 1962, 
about 9:00p.m., on the public sidewalk on the 
south side of Zenith Avenue a few steps east of the 
sidewall' intersection on Highland Drive in Salt 
Lake City. Highland Drive is a major thoroughfare 
running almost north and south, and Zenith Avenue 
is a residential street running east and west. 
At the time of the accident, and during the 
three months preceding, Bettilyon's was in 
possession and control of the real property located 
on the southeast corner of Zenith Avenue and Highland 
Drive, which abutted the sidewalk where plaintiff 
fell (R. 22). Plaintiff would show that before June 
of 1961, Bettilyon's used the property to sell swim-
ming pools and had built a display pool with 
attractive and appropriate 1~~ and landscaping 
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4 
thereon. A high chain link fence was erected 
along the north side of the property running within 
about two feet of the south side of the south side-
walk on Zenith Avenue. After June of 1961, 
Bettilyon 1 s ceased doing active business on the 
property (R. 22), the property was not maintained 
and it fell into a state of total neglect. By 
August, 1962, high weeds grew up on the property 
and on both sides of the fence along the Zenith 
Avenue sidewalk. The weeds surrounding the side~~alk 
were three to four feet high and grew over and onto 
the public sidewalk, leaving only an apparently 
clear narrow path of about two feet through which 
pedestrians could walk (Defendants' Exhibit 2). 
Plaintiff would show that defendants• Exhibit 
2 is a photograph taken within a week after plain-
tiff's accident showing the condition of the side-
walk when plaintiff fell. During her deposition, 
plaintiff marked Exhibit 2 l-1ith an ink "x' 1 to show 
the approximate point where she fell. (Deposition 
P· 22). Plaintiff would show that the photograph 
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5 
is a vie\o~ looking east up the Zenith Avenue side-
walk with the photographer standing at the sidewalk 
intersection with the Highland Drive side\·1allt. 
Defendants' Exhibits 1, 3, 4 and 5 are photographs 
shouing various views looking north or south on 
the same sidewalk at various stages after the fence 
and improvements were removed from the property and 
lo~eeds cleared al1ay by Bettilyon' s after plaintiff 1 s 
accident. Plaintiff is also including with the 
Exhibits admitted in evidence a sixth photograph, 
which plaintiff "1ould sho\1 is a view looking west 
dotm the Zenith Avenue side\-1alk fron1 the east side 
of Bettilyon•s property showing more graphically 
the height of the weeds and extent of obstruction 
at the time plaintiff fell. 
On the north-east corner of the intersection 
of Highland Drive and Zenith Avenue ·Has sitauted 
the Beefeaters Inn. Plaintiff 'vould show that the 
Inn had numerous cars moving in and out of its 
parking lot opening onto both Highland Drive and 
Zenith Avenue. Thus it '~ould be less safe for a 
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pedestrian to walk on the north side of Zenith 
Avenue, past the often used Beefeaters • drivel-lay, 
than to wallt on a regular residential side't-lalk. 
The next intersection east of Highland Drive on 
Zenith Avenue is 14th East, a distance of approxi-
mately 880 feet from Highland Drive. 
Plaintiff lived for one month before the acci-
dent in the east side of a duplex situated 
immediately east of Bettilyon 1 s property on Zenith 
Avenue. Mr. Alec Birrell owned the duplex and 
lived in its west side. Plaintiff had complained 
of the weeds to the Salt Lake City Street Department 
before the accident (Deposition p. 16) and Mr. 
Birrell had complained of the ,.,eeds at least three 
times to the city before the accident (Deposition 
p. 18). 
On August 22, 1962, plaintiff walked west 
from her home along the sidewalk past the weeds and 
south on the east sidewalk of Highland Drive to a 
grocery store. There she bought a small sack of 
groceries, met Mr. Birrell, and walked back with 
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him along the same route. On approaching Zenith 
Avenue she said to Mr. Birrell, "Here is where we 
~tingle file'' (Deposition p. 17). She did not 
notice anything about the sidewalk to alarm her 
~eposition p. 17). Plaintiff and Mr. Birell 
\~ould testify that plaintiff moved forward, 
watching where she was going to make her way 
along the path through the weeds. Without warn-
ing. she felt her right foot caught in something 
as if it were a "loop or noose" around her right 
ankle (Deposition pp. 18,20). She was pulled to 
the ground and when others attempted to lift her, 
she then and only then found her foot tangled in 
the loop or noose of weeds. The persons lifting 
her had to pull her foot back out of the weeds 
rather than lifting her straight up (Deposition 
p. 8). Plaintiff would show that the noose was 
formed by sticky yellow tops on the weeds 
adhering together. 
Plaintiff testified at page 18 of her 
Deposition: 
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"Q. You didn't even observe what caused 
you to fall? 
A. No, DOt until after I had fallen and 
was caught." 
page 20, she said: 
''Q. And how was it caught? 
A. Let's see, how I can word it. Just 
as if my foot had caught in something 
like that. I can't describe it other 
than my foot was caught in the weeds 
as if it were a loop or noose. 
Q. Did you examine the sidewalk carefully 
enough to determine whether or not 
there was a pathway past those weeds? 
A. Those weeds underneat· · .1~-r~ not visible. 
The weeds on the side came over, and I 
was walking according to them. I don't 
think most people walk with their face 
right down, right there. 
Q. But when you went to the store did you 
take the same route? 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. And you didn't have any trouble in 
getting by them then. You didn't 
catch your feet in the weeds? 
A. Not in going down." 
Mr. Birrell was walking immediately behind 
her when she fell and would testifY that he and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
plaintiff were not talking when she fell and as 
far as he could tell from his position in the 
rear, she was watching where she was walking to 
get past the weeds and was proceeding cautiously. 
As to lighting of the area, plaintiff said 
at page 9 of her Deposition: 
·~. There is an arc light, is there not, 
on the corner? 
A • A very poor one • 
Q. l-1ell, isn 1 t there an arc light which 
lights up the corner for the parking 
at the Beefeaters Cafe? 
A. Well, they have a big floodlight around 
the side of their place for their own 
driveway. 
Q. So that the street is fairly well 
illuminated? 
A. Well, it is a little past a country 
street. It isn't a bright lighted 
street but is the corner where you 
can see to turn. 
Q. Now at 9:00 it wasn't pitch dark, as 
we have described? 
A. No, but it was enough for the city to 
have turned on their lights. 
Q. Was it dusk? 
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A. No. It was later than that. It was 
dark. It wasn't pitch dark but it 
had turned dark. It was past the 
twilight and that sort of period. 11 
At the time of the accident, plaintiff was a 
beautician (Deposition p. 6) and thus was active 
and used to being on her feet. She was wearing a 
pair of low shoes with heels about one-inch high, 
"a good walking shoe" (Deposition p. 16). 
At times before the accident, plaintiff had 
walked around the area rather than past the weeds, 
but she testified she did so not because of fear 
of falling but because the weeds had sticky tops 
on them which spotted dresses (Deposition pp. 5, 
16), and on the occasion of the accident she was 
wearing sports clothes and was not concerned about 
spots, so she took the path past the weeds 
(Deposition p. 17). 
Bettilyon's, Inc. moved for Summary Judgment 
on the grounds that the record showed (1) 
Betti1yon's had no duty to eliminate natural weeds 
growing over the city sidewalk, (2) plaintiff 
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assumed the risk of walking on the sidewalk as a 
matter of law, and (3) plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law (R. 24). Defendant 
Salt Lalce City Corporation joined in the Motion upon 
the latter two grounds (R. 26). At hearing on the 
Motion, defendants' Exhibits 1 through 5, the five 
photographs were admitted in evidence for purposes 
of the Motion, and plaintiff's Deposition was 
published. Based on such Exhibits and Deposition, 
the Complaint, Answers, Pre-Trial Order and 
Bettilyon' s Ans,~ers to Interrogatories, the Court 
entered Summary Judgment in favor of each defendant 
(R. 28, 29). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT 
BETTILYON'S, INC. HAD NO DUTY TO ELtMINATE WEEDS 
GROWING OVER THE PUBLIC SIDEWALl<, THAT THE WEEDS 
WERE NOT AN OBSTRUCTION CONSTITUTING A NUISANCE 
WHICH BE'rl'ILYON'S SHOULD HAVE REMOVED, AND THAT 
THE WEEDS WERE NATURAL GROWTH AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
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Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Billings (Okla., 
1~59), 353 P. 2d 636, recognizes the logical rule 
that while an abutter owes no duty to the public 
to maintain or repair the public sidewalk, this 
being the city's duty, he does owe a duty to 
persons lawfully using the sidewalk not to create 
or maintain a condition on his property which 
forms an obstruction on the public way. There, 
a pedestrian tripped at night over a tree which 
had been felled and left for seven or eight 
months lying partially on the public sidewalk. 
The tree had not been felled by Safeway, but by 
one whom Safeway authorized to move a home from 
Safeway's property, and to move the home the 
tree had to be felled. The court held that the 
mere maintenance by Safeway on its property 
abutting the public sidewalk of a dangerous con-
dition to the free flow of traffic over the side-
walk, without regard to the matter of its creation, 
was sufficient evidence of negligence to justify 
submission of the question of liability to the jury. 
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Concho Construction Co. v. Oklahoma Natural 
Gas Co., (C. A. lOth, 1953), 201 F. 2d 673, applied 
the same rule where a bulldozer operator grading 
the shoulder of a highway struck an unmarked under-
ground gas riser, burning the bulldozer. The pipe 
line was on the highway side of what appeared to be 
the highway right of way boundary fence, but actually 
the fence had been placed several feet south of the 
highway right of way boundary line so that the pipe 
line was within the boundaries of the gas company's 
right of way for the pipe line. In reversing Summary 
Judgment in favor of defendant, the court said at 
pages 674-5: 
" • • (T)he owner of land abutting a 
highway o'-Jes a duty to keep it from being a 
source of danger to the public or to travelers 
upon and lawful users of the highway • • • 
(T)he gas company owed him the same duty that 
an abutting property o~ner owes to the ordinary 
and customary user of a public highway, that 
is, to use reasonable care not to maintain a 
dangerous condition which might be injurious 
to such users. A question of fact was present 
which should have been determined after a 
trial of the case and should not have been 
disposed of on a Motion for Summary Judgment." 
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This Court in Basinger v. Standard Furniture 
(1950), 118 Utah 121, 220 P. 2d 117, said: 
"there exists no obligation on the part 
of an abutter to keep the sidewalk adjoining 
his premises in repair, nor is he liable for 
any state of disrepair. His obligation can 
only arise where he creates through use or 
otheno~ise some unsafe or dangerous condition." 
The rule that an abutter owes no duty to repair 
sidewalk defects he does not cause does not apply 
here. The reason for that rule is succinctly set 
out in Joel v. Electrical Research Products, Inc. 
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938), 94 F. 2d 588, 590, as: 
"The control over sidewalks exercised 
of right by the municipality in which they 
are located circumscribes the freedom of 
action of the abutter and correspondingly 
limits his duty to repair." 
Such reason obviously does not apply to a sidewalk 
obstruction resulting from a condition on abutting 
property because the municipality does not exercise 
control over the abutting property. That property, 
in this case, was admittedly in possession and 
control of defendant Bettilyon 1 s, Inc. (R. 22). 
To the extent a condition maintained on abutting 
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15 
property interferes with free use of the side\-Jalk 
by pedestrians or is dangerous or unsafe to 
pedestrians upon the sidewalk, the abutter is free 
to and is best able to remedy such condition. 
Since the '.Jeeds must be removed to protect the side-
walk and since the abutter is free to and is best 
able to remove them, therefore, there is no reason 
to limit his duty to remove the obstruction. 
Helpful in shole~ing the duty in this case are 
the many cases holding that an abutter has a duty 
to use due care to prevent trees on his property 
from falling on persons lawfully using the highway, 
whether or not the landowner actively causes the 
fall and whether or not the fall is due to natural 
processes. See the annotation at 11 A.L.R. 2d 636, 
collecting such cases. Such rule follows, as put 
in Prosser on Torts (2d Ed., 1955), page 427: 
" ••• for the obvious reason that the 
man in possession is in a position of control 
and best able to prevent harm to others. It 
has been said before that the privilege of a 
possessor of land to m&te use of his property 
is qualified by a due regard for the interests 
of others who may be affected by it. He is 
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under the obligation to make only a reasonable 
use of his property, which causes no unreason-
able harm to those in the vicinity." 
t~hile the evidence will not show that Bettilyon 1 s 
planted the weeds on which plaintiff fell, nor that 
Bettilyon's pushed the weeds over onto the sidewalk, 
such lacl( of active negligence should mal~e no 
difference. Can it be said that an abutter who lets 
poison ivy grow on his land and permits it to grow 
onto the city sidewalk is not liable for the skin 
irritation incurred by pedestrians? Can an abutter 
allo'o~ strong vines to grow from his property over 
the city sidewalk and say he has no duty to remove 
them to a pedestrian ~.Jho trips thereon? We think not. 
Heeds are not to be compared with natural snow 
and ice, which the abutter has no duty to remove 
from the public sidewalk unless he causes or other-
wise creates an unusual accumulation, because the 
abutter does nothing to put snow on the sidewalk and 
has no way of preventing it from falling there. But 
the abutter does put ~-1eeds on the sidel-7alk by per-
mitting them to grow so high that they fall from his 
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property over onto the sideualk. He can easily 
prevent them from being on the sidet>~alk by 
removing them from the property immediately 
bordering the side"1alk. 
Snow falls often and irregularly, so it is 
an unreasonable burden to require an abutter to 
shovel the sidewalk every time it sn0\-1S, night 
or day. Holiever, t-Ieeds grow slol-.7ly and predictably 
through the summer, and one removal, at the 
abutter's convenience, Hill prevent them from 
becoming an unreasonable obstruction to pedestrians. 
Snow falls quickly, making it impossible to 
lay do~m an arbitrary rule as to the exact time 
after each storm when the snow must be removed. 
But weeds grow slowly and it can be said, without 
unduly burdening abutters, that l-1eeds need only be 
removed before they become an unreasonable 
obstruction to pedestrians. Such a rule precludes 
quibbling about each untrimmed blade of grass on the 
side,~allt, for it eliminates trivia as a matter of 
lau and leaves a jury question as to the reasonableness 
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of greater overgrowth. 
If it is said here that Bettilyon's had no 
duty to remove these ueeds, then it must follow 
that any abutter throughout any urban area can, 
with immunity, allow vegetation from his property 
to completely overgrow and completely block any 
city sidewalk, and can, l-7ith immunity, force 
pedestrians to pick their way through virtual 
jungles of thorny, scratchy, rodent-infested, 
skin-irritating, litter-collecting overgrowth. 
So there is n reasonable basis for the rule of 
no duty for abutters to remove natural snowfall, 
and there is a reasonable basis and need for an 
opposite rule as to natural overgrowth of weeds 
onto the public sidewalk in urban areas. 
The rule of the Restatement of Torts, Section 
363, being: 
"Neither a possessor of land nor a 
lessor, vendor or other transferor thereof, 
is subject to liability for bodily harm 
caused to others outside the land by a 
natural condition of the land other than 
trees grol-ling near a highway." 
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should not be applied in this action for two 
reasons. 
First, there is no reasonable or logical 
basis for the distinction between trees and other 
natural vegetation in urban areas, and we have not 
found a single ease disclosing the basis for such 
distinction. Surely the duty of an abutter with 
regard to trees should be the same as for poison 
ivy or strong vines growing across the sidewalk, 
f'or 
and thus the same/weeds so overgrowing the side-
ualk that they constitute an unreasonable hazard 
and obstruction to the public. Indeed the duty 
should be greater for such ,.,eeds because the risk 
of harm from ,.,eeds is more obvious in that one can 
see weeds on the sidewalk and know that someone 
might trip on them, whereas one is not so likely 
to kn~., when a tree is apt to fall from age or 
disease. So Prosser, supra, page 431, says: 
"The rule of non-liability for natural 
conditions was obviously a practical necessity 
in the early cases, when land \·1as largely in 
a primitive state, It remains a necessity in 
rural communities, whero the burden of 
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inspecting and improving the land ~ould be 
out of all proportion to the harm usually 
threatened. Almost without exception the 
cases applying to it have arisen in the 
country. But it is scarcely a rule suited 
to cities, to say that a lando~mer may 
escape all liability for serious damage to 
his neighbors arising out of his property, 
merely by allowing nature to take its course. 
There are indications that a different rule 
is developing in urban centers. It has been 
held that there is liability for negligently 
allowing a tree to decay and fall into a 
city street, and for permitting malodorous 
seaweed to accumulate on a harbor beach." 
We submit that it is no less a hardship on 
urban abutters to require removal of naturally 
created obstructions than to require removal of 
artifically created obstructions. See Arbuckle v. 
Wasatch Land & Improvement Co. (1951), 120 Utah 
338, 234 P. 2d 607, imposing liability on the 
abutter for injury sustained by a user of the 
sidewalk who fell on a surveyor's stm(e left along-
side the sidewalk by the abutter. 
Secondly, the Restatement rule for natural 
conditions should not be applied to this case 
because there simply is no basis in the record 
upon which the trial court could make a dete~ination 
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as to whether or not these weeds were a natural 
condition. The Restatement of Torts in Comment 
b following Section 363, says: 
'''Natural condition of the land 1 is 
used to indicate that the condition of 
land has not been changed by any act of 
a human being, • • • with or l'lithout the 
consent of the then possessor. It is also 
used to include the natural growth of 
trees, weeds and other vegetation upon 
land not artifically made receptive thereto. 
On the other hand a structure erected upon 
land is a non-natural or artificial con-
dition, as are trees or plants planted or 
preserved and changes in the surface by 
excavation or filling, irrespective of 
l-1hether they are harmful in themselves 
or become so only because of the subsequent 
operation of natural forces." 
The only fact which the trial court had before 
it to determine whether or not these weeds were 
"natural growth," which the trial court said in its 
Summary Judgment was the reason for dismissing 
Bettilyon's (R. 22), was the fact that the weeds 
were growing. Such was insufficient evidence 
for the Court to determine the fact question of 
whether Bettilyon's artificially created a 
hazardous non-natural or artificial condition and 
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plaintiff is entitled to try her case unless the 
record discloses, as a matter of law, that the 
weeds were not artificially created. If this 
Court were to apply the rule of no duty on 
abutters to remove natural sidewalk overgrowth 
in urban areas, l-1hich we urge should not be the 
rule, then plaintiff would rely on her proof, 
none of '"hich '"as before the trial court, that 
Bettilyon 1 s made the land artificially receptive 
to weeds by landscaping the area for a swimming 
pool and by planting, fertilizing and irrigating 
the lalm, thus mal<ing the land more fertile and 
more receptive to weeds. Plaintiff would show 
that the fence, a structure created by Bettilyon's, 
artificially caused weeds to grow excessively along 
the sidewalk, for the fence tended to accumulate 
l.Jeeds around it as the wind dropped seeds while 
blm-1ing against it. Finally, plaintiff would 
show that the location of the fence within a few 
feet of the sidewalk would make all the high weeds 
fall onto the sidel-7alk rather than mlling partially 
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to the south and partially on the sidewalk. 
Plaintiff should be entitled to have submitted 
to the jury the factual issue of whether or not 
these weeds were artificially or naturally on 
the side,-1allt and should not be denied that right 
because the trial court assumed that since the 
weeds were growing, they t~ere natural growth. 
Next, the duty of Bettilyon•s to remove these 
weeds from the public sidewalk arose by virtue of 
Section 10-8-23, U. C. A~ 1953, which provides: 
11They (cities) may regulate and con-
trol the use of sidewalks and all structures 
thereunder or thereover; and they may require 
the Olmer or occupant, or the agent of any 
owner or occupant, of property to remove all 
weeds and noxious vegetation from such pro:-
perty, and in front thereof to the curb line 
of the street, and to keep the sidewalks in 
front of such property free from litter, 
sno,-1, ice and obstructions." 
- -
and by Section 10-8-24, u. c. A., 1953, providing: 
"They (cities) may regulate and prevent 
the throwing or depositing of ashes, offal, 
dirt, garbage or any offensive matter in and 
prevent injury or obstruction to any street, 
sidewalk, avenue, alley, park or public 
ground." 
Section 38-1-8 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
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Lake City, 1955, enacted pursuant to such statutes, 
provides: 
"It shall be unlal<lful for any person 
owning, occupying or having control of any 
premises, to place or permit upon the side-
walk or the half of the street next to such 
premises: 
(1) any broken l-1are, glass, filth, 
rubbish, refuse matter, ice, water, mud, 
garbage, ashes, tin cans or other like 
substances. 
(2) any wagons, lumber, wood, boxes, 
fencing, building material, dead trees, 
tree stumps, merchandise or other thing 
which shall obstruct such public street 
or sidewalk or any part thereof, or the 
free use and enjoyment thereof, or the 
free passage over and upon the same, or 
any part thereof without the permission 
of the board of conunissioners." 
Defendant Bettilyon's may not escape liability 
herein upon the ground that it had no knowledge of 
the noose in the weeds which tripped plaintiff, 
since as stated in Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed (1954), 
1 Utah 2d 308, 265 P. 2d 1013, 1016: 
••Negligence may be the proximate cause 
of damage even though the actor was not able 
to foresee the injury in the precise form in 
'o~hich it occurred, nor anticipate the precise 
damage l.Jhich would result from his negligence." 
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Finally, Bettilyon's bad the duty to remove 
these weeds, independent of negligence, because 
the weeds were a nuisance. Section 78-38-1, 
u. c. A., 1953, provides: 
"Anything which is injurious to health, 
or indecent, or offensive to the senses, or 
an obstruction to the free use of property, 
so as to interfere with the comfortable 
enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance 
and the subject of an action." 
There are numerous cases in which sidewalk 
obstructions or defects have been held to be 
nuisances which the abutter has the duty to 
remove. In Salt Lake City v. Schubach (1945), 
108 Utah 266, 159 P. 2d 149, where a pedestrian 
'~as injured by a defective sidewalk vault door, 
this Court said at pages 152-3: 
''The adjoining landowner has no more 
right than any other person to do an act 
which renders the use of the sidewalk 
hazardous or less secure than it would be 
but for sue h an act. v1hen he does so, he 
is guilty of a nuisance and liable to any 
person who using due care is injured thereby. 
The person who created or continues the 
nuisance is thus liable irrespective of the 
question of negligence on his part." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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In Updegraff v. City of Norman (Okla., 1955), 
287 P. 2d 909, a hedge growing into a public alley 
from private land was held to be a nuisance which 
the city could not be enjoined from removing as an 
-
obstruction. The annotation at 88 A.L.R. 2d 629 
recites as the majority rule that while trees along 
a highway do not constitute a nuisance per se, they 
become a nuisance where they obstruct or interfere 
with the use of the highway or street or endanger 
the safety of travelers. 
Thus, when these weeds are viewed in light of 
whether they, as an obstruction, constituted a 
nuisance, neat distinctions as to natural versus 
unnatural growth, creation versus maintenance of 
a condition or active versus passive negligence 
will disappear. For, as said in Calder v. City 
and County of San Francisco (Cal., 1942), 123 P. 
2d 897, 898-9, in an action pertaining to a defect 
in a drivel-lay over the public sidel-1alk: 
1
'The final question is: Are the 
obstructions or encroachments involved 
unreasonable and against the public rights 
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and general welfare? • • • The question 
always comes back to the point: Are they 
unreasonable, and do they make the street 
unsafe for the public use? The major factor 
in the test on the question of nuisance of 
such cases is therefore the factor of 
reasonableness and, for all practical pur-
poses, the same factor of reasonableness is 
the major factor in test on the question of 
negligence.'' 
So also Prosser, supra, page 431, in discussing the 
abutter's duty with regard to natural conditions on 
his land, says: 
"The suggestion is therefore pertinent 
that the ordinary rules as to nuisance should 
apply in the case of natural conditions, and 
that it is a question of the locality, the 
seriousness of the danger, and the ease with 
which it may be prevented. 11 
So said this Court in Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 
71 Utah 1, 262 P. 269, 273 and in Cannon v. 
Neuberger, 1 Utah 2d 396, 268 P. 2d 425, 426: 
"The test of whether the use of the 
property constitutes a nuisance is the 
reasonableness of the use complained of in 
the particular locality and in the manner 
and under the circumstances of the case." 
He submit that the free use of the public side-
walk is a privilege available to the entire public 
'
1hich should not be obstructed without just cause; 
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that there was no reason for Bettilyon's to permit 
these weeds to grol-1 up so high on its property that 
they fell over onto the sidewalk and so obstructed 
it that two persons could not walk abreast and so 
that pedestrians \·1ere subject to having their 
clothes spotted from the sticky weeds; tha~ an 
abutter should not be heard to say it is his right 
to be neglectful of and inattentive toward con-
ditions on his urban property to the injury of 
others; that it is not an unreasonable burden upon 
abutters in urban areas to require them to keep 
obstructing growth from their abutting property 
off the public sidewalk; that such obstruction 
as here existed is by statutory definition a 
nuisance; that the weeds in question were not 
natural gro,;,~th; and that the trial court erred 
in holding defendant Bettilyon's, Inc had no 
duty to plaintiff to remove weeds. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PLAINTIFF CON-
TRIBUTORD..Y NEGLIGENT AS A l-IATTER OF LA\~. 
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The only evidence in the record tending to 
show plaintiff was contributorily negligent is 
that plaintiff knew the weeds generally were 
present and that she fell. Such evidence cannot 
constitute contributory negligence as a matter of 
lau, but must mal<.e a question for the jury. This 
is particularly so in light of the rule that plain-
tiff, against whom Summary Judgment was granted, is 
entitled to have all of the evidence and every 
inference fairly arising therefrom construed in the 
light most favorable to her, Holland v. Columbia 
Iron Mine Co., (1956), 4 Utah 2d 303, 293 P. 2d 
700, and the rule that Summary Judgment is not 
appropriate unless the record irrefutably disproves 
the allegations of the Complaint and makes it appear 
that no genuine issue of fact is presentable, 
Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 
(1960), 10 Utah 2d, 329, 353 P. 2d 168. In ruling 
that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a 
matter of la'" and thus dismissing both Bettilyon' s 
and the city, the trial court overlooked the facts 
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that (1) the accident occurred at night (Deposition 
p. 8), (2) that plaintiff's evidence would fully 
support the inference that she t-1as walking carefully 
fol"\o~ard past the l'1eeds, and there is no evidence in 
the record to negate such inference, (3) that the 
area was dimly lighted (Deposition p. 9), (4) that 
plaintiff did not see the exact defect which caused 
her fall, being the loop or noose formed by the 
weeds (Deposition p. 18), (5) that she saw nothing 
in the lo~alk to alarm her (Deposition p. 17) and 
(6) that plaintiff had ,.,alked through the same 
path befOre without injury (Deposition p. 18). 
Further there was no evidence in the record as to 
what alternative routes, and the relative safety 
and convenience thereof, were available to plain-
tiff and that was a specific reason given by the 
trial court in its Summary Judgment for dism-ssing 
both defendants (i. 22). 
Rodriguez v, City of Los Angeles, (Cal., 
1959) 341 P. 2d 410 is almost identical to this 
case on its facts. there the accident occurred 
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at 10:15 p.m., the abutter was in control of the 
corner property, plaintiff lived two houses away 
from the place of the accident, a three-foot high 
wire mesh fence existed in front of the abutting 
property four inches from the sidewalk, a clump 
of ice plant had gro\m through the fence onto 
the public sidewalk and had been there for some 
time, plaintiff walked from the corner with the 
fence on his right, his body was about a foot 
from the fence, he was looking directly ahead 
but not down on the sidewalk, he did not see any-
thing on the sidewalk in front of him but slipped 
on the ice plant. Plaintiff sued both the city 
and the abutter. On a jury verdict against both 
defendants, the city appealed but the abutter did 
not. The court, in affirming, said at page 416: 
"It is '~ell settled that, in the 
absence of notice or knol~ledge to the 
contrary, a pedestrian making normal use 
of the public side\-1alk has a right to 
assume that it is in reasonable safe con-
dition, and l>~hile he must use ordinary 
care for his personal safety and make 
reasonable use of his faculties to avoid 
injury to himself, he ie not required to 
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keep his eyes fixed on the ground or to be 
on constant lookout for danger. Even if a 
defect is one which might be visible to a 
person who is looking for such a condition, 
it does not follow that a pedestrian is 
guilty of negligence as a matter of law in 
failing to see and avoid it. Whether plain-
tiff made reasonable use of her faculties 
and lo~hether she should have observed the 
condition which caused her injury were 
questions of fact. The evidence was clearly 
sufficient to support the implied finding of 
the jury that plaintiff was not contributorily 
negligent." 
Here, there is nothing to show plaintiff was not 
walking carefully, she saw nothing to alarm her and 
did not see ~-1hat caused her to fall. Thus, this 
case also presents a jury question as to con-
tributary negligence. 
In Jackson v. Southwestern Public Service 
Company, (N. M., 1960) 349 P. 2d 1029, plaintiff, 
on crutches, in attempting to step from the curb 
to cross the street in the middle of the block, 
saw a hole next to the curb four to six feet long, 
tuo to three feet wide and six to eight inches 
deep with the ground around the hole damp from 
rain. Plaintiff believed he could cross the street 
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with safety and put his good foot on the curb 
next to the hole, placed his crutches on either 
side of the hole, and stepped. His crutch slipped 
off the pavement into the hole and he fell, 
injuring his leg. The court said at pages 1033-34: 
"This court has held that mere knowledge 
that a walk is defective is not enough to con-
stitute contributory negligence. Even if the 
l-lal!c is defective, if a reasonably prudent 
person believes he can cross it lJith safety, 
the knowledge of such defect does not con-
stitute contributory negligence as a matter 
of lal-1 • • • The only thing to convict 
plaintiff of contributory negligence is the 
existence of the hole and t~e £act that he 
fell. This does not make ~vt a case where 
reasonable minds would not differ." 
Likewise in McLaughlin v. City of Los Angeles, 
(Cal., 1943) 140 P. 2d 416, plaintiff, walking 
along an unimproved dirt road, slipped on the edge 
of a hole in the road. The road was rutted and 
full of holes, many of which l·7ere a foot or more 
deep. Plaintiff had lived for several years three 
blocks from the ac·cident, had often passed the 
place of the accident and was quite familiar l-7ith 
the conditions there. The accident occurre~ at 
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about 8:30p.m. with no street lights on a dark 
clear night. As plaintiff proceeded along a 
fence line on high ground on the side of the 
road which was ordinarily clear, he found a car 
parked against the fence so he could not pass. 
Looking to the left of the car, he sal'1 what 
appeared to be a path wide enough for him to pass 
between the car and a hole on its left, but as 
he started to go around, his foot slipped on the 
edge of the hole and he fell sustaining injury. 
Defendant contended that the danger confronting 
plaintiff was obvious, that he knel·1 the dangerous 
condition of the street, and that he l-7as therefore 
guilty of negligence in using it at all. The court 
said at page 418: 
"If to a man of ordinary prudence it 
\vould appear that in spite of the danger 
he can by taking available precautions 
safely use the passage way, he is not 
negligent in using it with those pre-
cautions ••• The event, it is true, 
proved plaintiff's course around the 
automobile to be unsafe, but negligence 
is not to be judged exclusively by hind-
sight. The question of l-1hether plaintiff 
exercised due care in attempting to pass 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
around the automobile instead of retracing 
his steps, was, under the circumstances, 
one of fact for the jury." 
That is exactly the case here. Plaintiff thought 
her path \-ISS clear. She sau nothing to alarm her 
(Deposition p. 17). 
Thus tle submit the rule applicable to this 
case is that plaintiff's lcno~o~ledge of the existence 
of the weeds only increased her standard of care 
and required her to proceed with caution commensu-
rate with her kno"1ledge and her ability to cope 
llith the to~eeds, that she must have used only such 
care as a reasonably prudent person '-1ould use 1:-1ith 
knowledge of the weeds, and that whether or not 
she used such care is a question for the jury. 
This case is to be distinguished from this 
Court's holdings in Eisner v, Salt Lake City, 
(1951) 120 Utah 675, 238 P. 2d 416 and in Cole v. 
Kloepfer, (1953) 123 Utah 452, 260 P. 2d 518, 
where in both cases pedestrians with prior 
knowledge of the specific sidewalk defects which 
injured them and unobstructed daylight vie,'ls were 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
distracted in one instance by a rush of opposing 
children and in the other by a speeding automobile. 
Both, while distracted and because of the distraction, 
stepped in a sidel1alk hole and the court held in both 
instances that because the distractions l'7ere not 
unexpected and substantial, the consequent forgetful-
ness constituted contributory negligence as a matter 
or lal1. This case is different from those f:l-10 cases 
in that here (1) there was not a daylight view of 
the weeds (Deposition p. 9), (3) there was not an 
unobstructed view of the noose (Deposition p. 18), 
(3) plaintiff had no knowledge of the noose 
~eposition p. 18), and (4) there was no evidence 
of forgetfulness (Deposition pp. 18, 20). Indeed 
the inference of plaintiff's evidence is one of 
all due care. 
The Eisner and Cole cases ride off on the 
ground of an unsubstantial distraction, whereas 
in this case there is no evidence of distraction 
but is in fact evidence of careful, attentive, 
reasonable lookout with inability to actually see 
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the noose, the exact cause of the accident. The 
Eisner and Cole cases are decided on the ground of 
insufficient excuse for not watching where one is 
going, whereas here there is no such evidence. 
This case is more lil~e Hunt v. Tooele City, 
(1959) S Utah 2d 323, 334 P. 2d 558, t-1here the 
city appealed from a verdict in favor of a 
pedestrian who said she did not see the sidewalk 
hole in l-Jhich she fell. The city said she '"as 
contributorily negligent in not seeing it, since 
it was so obvious, but the court, at page 556, 
said: 
"In the absence of prior knowledge of 
the defect (the pedestrian) had a right to 
assume and act on the assumption that the 
street l-Jas in reasonably safe condition 
for travel." 
Here plaintiff had no prior knowledge of the noose 
which tripped her, and while she could see the weeds 
by the surrounding light, she could also see a path 
through the weeds on the sidewalk l-Jhich was 
apparently clear and it cannot be said as a matter 
of la~o~ that it uas negligence for her to proceed 
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through that apparently clear path. So in OWen 
v. City of Los An~eles, (Cal., 1947) 187 P. 2d 
860, in holding that '~hile plaintiff had kno~-1ledge 
of the general bad condition of the sidel-1alk, she 
had no kno,~ledge of the specific hole in which she 
stepped and therefore the questions of contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk were for the jury. 
Note also Clalison v. lJalgreen Drug, (1945) 108 Utah 
577, 162 P. 2d 759, holding that a pedestrian has 
no duty to keep his eyes constantly on the sidewalk. 
Wold v. Ogden City, ~953) 123 Utah 270, 258 
P. 2d 453, is distinguishable. There plaintiff 
observed in the afternoon a temporary trench dug 
by the city in front of his house and attempted to 
step across it at 2:30 a.m. on an extremely dark 
night l-lith no lights in the vicinity and l-Ias 
injured when a side of the trench gave '"ay under 
his foot. This Court held plaintiff l-las contributorily 
negligent and had assumed a known risk as a matter 
of la,~, saying at page 456: 
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"To deliberately attempt to cross under 
such circumstances seems to be that type of 
lac!~ of due care not attributable to the 
ordinary prudent person exercising care for 
his own safety • • • It would seem that a 
reasonable, prudent person would not expose 
himself to a knolm danger lo~hen there is an 
easy, knoon and convenient route around it." 
Here, plaintiff did not know of the noose 
which tripped her. True, in Hold, the court said 
it was 
11
• • • (N)o answer to say that plain-
tiff may not have known the bank of the 
trench would give way, since no adult person 
of ordinary intelligence, knowing of the 
trench '-3ould take such chances on what 
counsel characterized as being an 'extremely 
dark area, no lights and in the middle of 
the night and in the shade of trees, 1 l-lhere 
there was an easy and safe access to his 
home in a matter of minutes." 
HolJever, in lJgld, the caving of the trench or 
slipping into it was a strong likelihood, but it 
cannot be said that as a matter of law the tripping 
in the noose or loop would be such a strong likeli-
hood that no adult person, kno~1ing of the l-7eeds, 
l.zould walk past them, particularly when it is con-
sidered that this area was not so dark as to be 
Pitch dark (Deposition p. 9), that there existed 
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3n apparently safe and convenient route past the 
weeds on the clear sidewalk, and that plaintiff 
had walked safely past the weeds before 
(Deposition p. 20). 
We submit that it is a question for the jury 
as to whether plaintiff, standing on the corner 
and knowing of the l~eeds, exercised that degree of 
due care for her own safety which the ordinary 
prudent person would use. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING PLAINTIFF 
ASSUNED THE RISK AS A MATTER OF LAl'J, AND THE 
RECORD lvAS INSUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO SO 
RULE. 
In Wold v. Ogden City, ~~2_ra~ this Court 
applied the doctrine of assumption of risk saying 
at page 456, ''(the doctrine) has been extended to 
some situations where one knol-lS of a condition and 
concludes to accept its attendant hazards and acts 
accordingly without force of necessity." This 
case is distinguishable from Wold, for there the 
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knouledge of the trench constituted, by plain-
tiff's m~n admission, "a know danger," but in 
this case it cannot be said that the weeds them-
selves constituted a known danger to one walking 
through the apparently clear path of sidewalk 
past the weeds. In Wold, the court approved 
this language of Prosser ,E!l_ To~~~' Chapter 9, 
Assumption of Risk: 
"In the usual case, (plaintiff's) 
knowledge and appreciation of the danger 
l-Jill be a question for the jury; but 
where it is clear that any person of 
normal intelligence in his position must 
have understood the danger, the issue 
must be decided by the court." 
Here, plaintiff's lack of kncn-1ledge of the 
noose prevented her from appreciating the danger 
and certainly the amount of danger, and there-
fore it is a jury question whether the knowledge 
of the lo7eeds themselves would cause a reasonably 
prudent person to appreciate the danger so as to 
take another route. 
In Clay v. Dunfor~J (1952) 121 Utah 171, 239 
P. 2d 1075, this Court said at 1076: 
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"The essential elements of assumed 
risk are knowledge, actual or implied, by 
the plaintiff of a specific defect or 
dangerous condition caused by the negligence 
of the defendant in the violation of some 
duty owed to the plaintiff, together with 
plaintiff's appreciation of the danger to 
be encountered and his voluntary exposure 
of himself to it • • • Knowledge of the 
risk is the watchword of • • • assumption 
of risk • • • Furthermore, plaintiff's 
failure to exercise ordinary care to dis-
cover the danger is not properly a matter 
of assumption of risk, but of the defense 
of contributory negligence." 
And Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion 
pointed out, "Carelessness is not the same thing 
as intelligent choice." Thus it is clear that 
for assumption of risk to apply, plaintiff must 
have knowledge of the specific defect and here, 
she had no knowledge of the noose, and it cannot 
be said she was contributorily negligent in not 
seeing it. 
Assumption of risk also involves voluntary 
exposure to risk, or as more precisely put in 
Jacques v. Farrimond, (1963) 14 Utah 2d 166, 380 
P. 2d 133, did plaintiff have a reasonable 
opportunity to make an alternative choice. Here 
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pla1ntiff 1 s alternative was to go around the weeds. 
That meant either walking in the street to her 
house, an obviously greater danger, or proceeding 
north across Zenith Avenue to the north side of 
the street and east up Zenith to 14th East, a 
distance of one block, across Zenith and back 
west to her home, a distance of an additional 
three quarters of a block. As put in Prosser, 
supra, page 312: 
"The risk is not assumed where the 
conduct of the defendant has left the 
plaintiff no reasonable alternative • • • 
One who uses a defective highway does not 
assume the risk where there is no reasonable 
alternative route. In general the plaintiff 
is not required to surrender a valuable legal 
right, such as the use of his own property as 
he sees fit, because the defendant's conduct 
has threatened harm if the right is exercised. 
By placing him in the dilemma, the defendant 
has deprived him of his freedom of choice, 
and so cannot be heard to say that he has 
voluntarily assumed the risk." 
Certainly the right to walk on the public 
sidewalk without running into unreasonable 
obstruction is a similar valuable legal right. In 
t~old v. Ogden City, _!.u_p_!:"a, there was justification 
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for the trench in that the city can reasonably 
temporarily inconvenience residents while digging 
necessary trenches. However, in this case there 
was simply no justification whatsoever for the 
weeds overgrowing the sidewalk. How can defen-
dants permit the weeds to overgrow the sidewalk, 
which have no utility whatsoever, and then claim 
the plaintiff voluntarily assumed that risk when 
she reasonably exercised her right to walk on 
the public sidewalk through a path which. appeared 
to be safe at the time. 
Certainly in point is Owen v. City of Los 
~geles, supra. The California Court, when defen-
dant appealed on grounds of contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk, said at 187 P. 2d 864: 
"(Plaintiff) testified that before she 
stepped down she looked, that it was light 
enough to see the surface of the~~ but 
that she did not notice the hole. The pave-
ment in the gutter had been washed away along 
the curb, not only in the particular location, 
but for a considerable distance, including an 
area in front of plaintiff's home, which 
adjoined the place of her fall. While plain-
tiff's knowledge of the general condition of 
the gutter is admitted, it does not appear 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
45 
that the erosion had created a generally 
dangerous condition, nor does it appear 
that plaintiff had knowledge that a hole 
existed at the point where she stepped 
from the curb. She testified that she did 
not know it. Of course, her knowledge of 
the general condition made it her duty to 
proceed into the street with more care than 
~auld have been demanded if she had been 
without such knowledge. It was her duty 
to look and to step down not casually, but 
carefully, for she had no right under the 
circumstances to believe that the surface 
of the gutter was even and smooth • • • 
~ether one who looked, did so carefully, 
is a question of fact • • • While there 
was a general condition of erosion, there 
was no evidence that there was a generally 
dangerous condition, or that the erosion 
had left other holes such as the one in 
question. It was this hole, and not the 
condition of the gutter generally, that 
caused plaintiff's accident ••• Knowledge 
that danger exists is not knowledge of the 
amount of danger necessary to charge a 
person with negligence in ~ssuming the 
risk caused by such danger. The doing of 
an act with appreciation of the amount of 
danger in addition to mere appreciation 
of the danger is necessary in order to say 
that as a matter of law that a person is 
negligent. Plaintiff was not chargeable 
with knowledge of the danger of the 
particular condition as a matter of law, 
merely because she had knowledge of the 
general condition of the surroundings. 
It is a question of fact whether her 
knowledge was such as to charge her with 
assumption of the risk." 
We submit that the Owen case presents exactly 
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the same factual situation as this case with regard 
to assumption of risk and contributory negligence 
and the same result must follow. The basis of the 
trial court's ruling on assumption of risk in the 
Summary Judgment, being, "plaintiff l-.7as aware of 
the hazard that existed'' (R. 28), is destroyed by 
the Owen case, for here plaintiff also testified 
she did not and could not see the noose or loop 
of weeds (Deposition pp. 18, 20). 
In Jackson v. Southwestern Pacific Service 
Co., ~upra, where plaintiff attempted to go over 
a known hole on his crutches, defendants raised 
the defense of assumption of risk. The court 
decided that assumption of risk was a jury question 
upon the same grounds that it decided that con-
tributory negligence was a matter for the jury, 
holding that mere knowledge that a walk is 
defective is not enough to constitute contributory 
negligence or assumption of risk as a matter of 
law since even if the walk is defective, if a 
reasonably prudent person believes he can cross 
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it with safety, the knowledge of such defect does 
not constitute contributory negligence or assump-
tion of risk as a matter of law. Note also that 
in McLaughlin v. City of Los Angeles, supra, and 
in Rodriguez v. City of Los Angeles, supra, plain-
tiff in each case lived close to the defect in the 
sidewalk and must have had knowledge thereof, but 
the court in each instance refused to hold defend-
ant not liable as a matter of law. 
Finally, there was insufficient evidence in 
the record for the court to make any determination 
whatsoever as to \oJhat reasonable alternative was 
available to plaintiff. Plaintiff on trial would 
offer evidence of the many cars moving in and out 
of the Beefeaters' parking lot abutting the side-
walk on the north side of Zenith Avenue to present 
a jury question as to whether reasonable minds would 
think it safer to cross Zenith Avenue at the High-
land Drive intersection and walk past the Beefeaters' 
parking lot driveway at night with cars moving in 
and out over the sidewalk or to walk through the 
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apparently clear path on the sidewalk with the 
overgrowing \.Jeeds. The trial court did not have 
such evidence before it when it ruled upon the 
t*lotion and nothing recorded precludes plaintiff 
from offering such evidence. Therefore it cannot 
be said that the record irrefutably shows plain-
tiff assumed the risk as a matter of law. 
We submit that the question of assumption of 
risk was a matter for the jury in this case not 
only because it cannot be said as a matter of law 
that a reasonable person would not have acted as 
plaintiff did herein, but also because there is 
no factual basis in the record for the Court to 
determine whether plaintiff had a reasonable 
alternative choice of routes. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that defendant 
Bettilyon's, Inc., abutter to the public sidewalk, 
had a duty to remove weeds overgrowing from its 
property onto the public sidewalk, not only because 
it was negligence to not remove them, but because 
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they constituted a nuisance, or if an abutter has 
no duty to remove natural overgrowth, there is 
nothing in this record to determine, as a matter 
of law, whether or not these weeds were a natural 
. 
or artificial condition and plaintiff's evidence 
will sho''~ the weeds 'tJere an artificial condition 
caused by Bettilyon's. Therefore, Summary Judg-
ment should not have been entered dismissing 
Bettilyon's on that question. Further, it is 
submitted that it is a question for the jury 
whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
since the mere fact of plaintiff's walking and 
falling at night on a sidewalk 'to~hich she knew 
generally to be partially overgrown with weeds 
does not constitute contributory negligence as a 
matter of la'toJ. Finally it is submitted that the 
record shows that plaintiff did not have such 
knowledge of the hazard and degree of danger 
that it can be said she assumed the risk as a 
matter of law, nor is there sufficient evidence 
in the record to determine the reasonableness of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
50 
alternatives open to plaintiff to rule upon the 
issue of assumption of risk. Therefore, the 
Summary Judgment entered herein in favor of both 
defendants should be reversed and the case 
remanded for trial upon its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SI<EEN, HORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN and 
JOSEPH J. PALMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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